WCP3323

[1]¹

The Personality of "X".

Xenophanes² tell us that:

"Men foolishly think that Gods are born like as men are,

"And have too a dress like their own, and their voice and

their figure:

"But if oxen and lions had hands like ours, and fingers,

"Then would horses like unto horses, and oxen to oxen,

"Paint and fashion their god-forms, and give to them bodies

"Of like shape to their own, as they themselves too are

Fashioned."³

Casting his eyes upwards at the immensity of heaven, he declared that the One is God. He did not mean a personal God, distinct from the Universe. He was a Monotheist in contradiction to polytheistical contemporaries. But his Monotheism was Pantheism.

Instead of saying that the One is God, let us assume that the One is "X". In other words, let "X" represent the aggregate of all things. Then I am a part of X. In "X" I live, and move, and have my being. I am a person. Is X a person? What is a person? I know nothing more difficult to define. Many definitions can be found, but none of them are altogether satisfactory. Instead therefore of attempting to define, let us assume that "a man" is "a person", and that "a person" is a sentient being having some measure of will and intelligence and a consciousness, actual or potential, of past and present actions and involving the memory of past mental states as well as the consciousness of present mental states all occurring in orderly sequence. If in that sense "a man" is "a person" let us enquire [2]⁴ whether X can in any similar sense be a person.

Two youths, generally known as the "Siamese Twins", were bound together by a ligament a few inches long, and about an inch wide; and this ligament passed from the side of one of them to the side of the other. In the central portions of this ligament was a common circulation of blood, and a common nervous system. Thus a wound in those portions would be felt by each of them, and, if it had produced continuous bleeding, each of them would have bled to death. The afferent and efferent nerves ran to the nervous centres of each of them, and their capillaries intercalated. One of them become seriously ill, and, as death approached, the other showed alarming symptoms, and died within a very short interval.

It is certain that the Brothers, within the area traversed by the afferent and efferent nerves of each of them had sensation in common, one of them probably feeling much as the other felt.

[A drawing appears here of two men joined by a ligament between their torsos. They are labelled "B" and "A." The drawings of B and the central ligament are covered in red dots. A label under the drawing notes that the red dots represent the "field of nervous sensations" of "B".]

It is conceivable that this area might have been widely extended, and it is also conceivable that the nervous system of one of the Brothers, whom we will call "A", might have run into an adjoining part of the body of his Brother, whom we will call "B", while the nervous system of B stopped in the portion of the ligament furthest from himself. In such case there would be common sensation in the centre of the ligament, while A, in addition to his own sensations, would within the area traversed by his extended nervous system, share all the sensations [3]⁵ of B.

Let us carry the idea a step further. We will imagine that A’s nervous system ran right through B; while B’s stopped at the portion of the ligament furthest from his own body. In such case would not A, in addition to the sensations proper to his own nervous system, become conscious of all that were felt by B? Under such conditions would A cease to be a person? Would not A become a greater person, viz, A plus the sensations of B? And would B become a less person because A realised all his sensations?

Again one step further. Assume that an animal be tied to A by a similar ligament. A would then have in addition to his own sensations all the sensations of the animal. A + B and the animal would certainly be greater than A + B, nor would the personality of A be diminished or diffused by the addition of such sensation. If this be true, equally true must it be that A’s personality would increase in proportion to the sensations which he was capable of experiencing. But X is the aggregate of all things, and necessarily the aggregate of all sensations. The personality of X, like that of A, increases in proportion to his sensations. So far from X ceasing to be a person, he will be the conscious sum of all the personalities in the Universe. The conception that personality becomes diffused or diminished instead of increased in proportion as it is enlarged, seems altogether irrationational.

Now if X, the aggregate of all things, be not personal, then would the deduction of the sensation of the meanest of sentient creatures restore to him his personality? The idea seems ridiculous. Nevertheless, if A be a person, notwithstanding his having all the sensations of B, and X be not a person, there must be some point between [4]⁶ him and X where the personality ceases. How can his personality cease, or even be diminished, by the addition of sensation? Yet can we deny that sensation must necessarily increase as each link in the upward chain is forged?

If this reasoning be true, must we not necessarily hold that X is a person? Does the addition of the last link in the chain destroy the chain and reduce him to a senseless mechanism of the "dumb, dead, iron Devil" of Carlyle?⁷

[5]

The Personality of God

By Fred. Jackson Esq⁸